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The  joint effect  of both the  volume  of  credit  and its price  - that
is, the interest  rate-  is relevant  to firms' investment  decisions.
So effective  credit  policy  in  developing  countries  must  take into
account  the influence  of both the credit supply  and the interest
rate, not  just one or the other.
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Previous  approaches  to credit policy  and its role  sentiments  - that banks consider  in making
in the stabilization  and adjustment  of developing  lending  decisions. These  factors  affect banks'
countries  have emphasized  either the role  of the  decisions  independent  of a borrower's creditwor-
availability  of credit or the role of its price  - thiness. Thus, in times  of tight money,  firms that
that is, the Interest  rate. Dailami  and Giugale  would  otherwise  have received  loans may  be
argue  that effective  credit  policy in developing  denied them  and have to postpone  or cut back
countries  must take into account  both:  terest  investment  plans.
rate and credit channels.
Dailami  and Giugale  use their model  to
The authors  develop  their argument  in the  specify  an equation  relating  aggregate  private
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private investment,  using a model  of firms'  market  variables  - the real interest rate and
investment  behavior  in an economy  with  aggregate  credit. They estimate  the equation  for
exogenous,  time-varying  borrowing  constraints.  five developing  countries  (Brazil,  Colombia,
The model  incorporates  a credit ceiling  linked  to  India,  Korea, and Turkey)  using annual  data for
the fims'  net worth and the state  of the credit  1965-85,  and test the  joint significance  of both
market.  interest  rate and credit supply  conditions. Their
findings  show that interest rates  and credit
The state  of the credit market  depends  on  volume  exert a joint influence  on the behavior  of
factors  - such as credit and interest  rate policy,  private  investment  in the countries  examined
regulatoty  and supervisory  practices,  and market
The PRE Working  Paper  Series disseminates  the findings  of work  under  way  in the Bank's  Policy,  Research,  and External
Affairs  Complex.  Anobjectiveoftheseries  is to  getthese  fmdingsoutquickly,  even  if presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.
The findings.  interpretations,  and conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank policy.
Produced  by the PRE  Dissemination  CenterTeble  of  joutents
I*  Introduction  I  *0*  *******,.. . ..  ......................  ..........  1
II.  Theoretical  Framework  ......  ......  ...............  *.............  ...  4
III.  Empirical  Findings  ......................  ..  ......... 12
IV*  Conclusion  .........  .......  ...  ....  ... 20
References  2............................................................  27
List  of Tables
Table  1 ..........  ....  ..................................................  18
Table  2  ..  . . ...  ..  .......  .....  .*...  19
List  of  Charts
Chart 1 ................  ................................................  22
Chart  2  .........................  ................. 23
C-hart  3 o.o......  ....  ...................  ........  ...........  24
Chart 4  *  .....o  .... ......... *...........  ..........  ........ o..o..  25
Chart  5  *....o......  o  .*ooo....o.  .*o*o  o  o*.......*......  ............  *  o.....  262
I.  INTRODUCTION
Successive  developments  in  the  role  of  credit  policy  in  the  stabilization
and adjustment strategy of developing  countries have been toward greater
recognition  of the  importance  of interest  rate  channel  in influencing  the  pace
of financial  sector  reform, 1 in the  process  of allocative  efficiency, 3 and in
influencing  aggregate  private  spending.' Indeed,  the  earlier  emphasis  placed
on  volume  of credit  as an instrument  of policy,  both in  development  literature
and  practice,  as exemplified  most notably  in  the  IMP  approach  to stabilization
[see  for instance,  Polak  and  Argy (1971);  Keller  (1980)1,  is  now giving  way to
a  new conventional  wisdom about the virtues of positive  real interest  rate
policy.'  But ironically,  as this  view is gaining  the  status  of a  new orthodoxy
there  exists  a  growing  body  of  theoretical  research  and  empirical  evidence  which
proport  to return  the  quantitative  channel  of credit  policy  to the  forestage.
Thus,  there  exists  the  important  strand  of literature  on  credit  rationing
which either  in its micro context (Hodgman  (1960,  1962);  Jaffee  and Russell
(1976);  and Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981)1  or in its traditional  "availability
doctrine,"  context [Roosa  (1951);  Scott (1957);  Lindbeck (1962)]  has led to
rationalize  non-price  credit  rationing  even  in  environments  where  interest  rates
are  free  of administrative  control  and  regulation.$  Moreover,  by shifting  the
spotlight  from  the  saver/borrower  decisions  to  that  of  the  intermediary,  i.e.  the
1  On this  see,  McKinnon  (1973);  Khatkate  (1972);  Galbis  (1977);  and  World
Bank (1909).
2  See,  for  instance,  Balassa  (1982);  and  Roe (1982).
'  See,  Taylor  (1979,  1981);  van  Wijnbergen  (1983)  and  Dailami  (1989).
See  Sauv6  (1986)  for  current  state  of debate  on interest  rate  policy  in
developing  countries.
'  See also, Baltensperger  and Devinney  (1985)  for a recent  survey and
synthesis  of credit  rationing  theory.3
lender  or  the  '  Ink,  in  the  debate  about  the  link  between  credit/monetary  policy
and the real economy,  this literature  has provided  a  rational  basis for
consideration  of  the  joint  influences  of  interest  rate  and  credit  channels.  The
underlying  argument  being  that  an  increase  in  interest  rate,  for  instance,  could
also  be  accompanied  bv  a  reduction  in  the  level  of  bank  lending  as  a  result  of
banks'  efforts  to adjust  their asset portfolio,  thereby  reinforcing  the
contractionary  influence  of  higher  interest  rates.  The  net  outcome  could  be  a
more  severe  slowdown  in  economic  activity  then  anticipated.  Such  a  possibility
is  particularly  likely  in  a situation  where  the  economy  is  under  stabilization
measures.
Following  this  line  of  reasoning,  this  paper  argues  that  effective  credit
policy  in  the  context  of  developing  countries  must  acknowledge  the  influence  of
both  interest  rate  and  oredit  channels.  The argument  is elaborated  in the
context  of  the  link  between  credit  policy  and  private  investment  and  is  conducted
in  two  stages.
In  the  next  section,  we  draw  on  the  recent  literature  on  credit  rationing
to  introduce  a  form  of  bank  credit  constraint,  linked  to  the  firms'  net-worth  and
to  the  state  of  credit  market,  into  the  standard  neo-classical  model  of  firme'
investment  behavior.  While  the  relevance  of  borrowers'  net-worth,  i.e.,  cred..t
worthiness  to  banks'  lending  decisions  and  practices  is  familiar  and  has  been
well  documented,  both  theoretically  and  empirically,'  the  introduction  of  the
state  of  credit  market,  as  a component  of  the  supply  of  bank  loan  needs  some
elaboration.  We refer  to the state  of credit  market  as a shorthand  for  a
composite  of  several  factors  including  the  level  of  interest  rate,  the  pace  of
credit  policy,  the  stringency  to  which  regulation  and  supervision  on  the  banking
system  is imposed. These  factors  are  expected  to influence  banks'  lending
decisions  independently  of  their  impacts  on  the  creditworthiness,  i.e.,  net-worth
of individual  borrowers.  Thus,  including  the  state  of credit  market  in the
banks'  loan  supply  function  signifies  the  possibility  that  credit  to  a  particular
See,  for  instance,  Leland  and  Pyle  (1977);  Bernake  and  Gertler  (1989,
1990);  and  Calomiris  (1990).4
firm  may chang.e  as  the  result  of  macro  and  financial  fluctuations,  even  i#  the
borrower's  creditworthiness  has  not  changed.  Thus,  in  times  of  tight  money,  or
in  "bad  times,"  borrowers  that  otherwise  would  have  been  considered  eligible  are
likely  to  face  a  more stringent  credit  evaluation  process  or  simply  to  be  denied
loans.  As  a  consequence,  firms'  investment  plans  may have  to  be  postponed  or  cut
back.
In  Section  III  we  estimate  and  test  for  the  relevance  of  credit  market
condition  variables  over  a  set  of  developing  countries  over  the  last  two  decades;
specifically,  we  have  compiled  annual  time  series  data  on private  fixed  domestic
investment  and  other  relevant  variables  for  Brazil,  Colombia,  India,  Korea  and
Turkey  over  the  1965-85  period.'  Linear  three-stage  least  squares  are  used  in  the
estimation  to  correct  both  for  the  endogeneity  of  aggregate  and expected
variables  (via  instrumental  variables)  and  for  the  shortness  of  the  sample
period.
Our  findings  not  only  show  that  credit  market  condition  variables  as  a
whole  are  key  determinants  of  private  domestic  investment  behavior  but  also  (and
perhaps  more  interestingly)  that  it  is  their  expected  future  values  that  really
matters.  Moreover,  the  expected  volume  of  aggregate  credit  appears  to  be  the
single  most  important  variable  in  explaining  investment  behavior.  This  implies
that  credit  constraints  have  actually  been  binding  in  the  countries  in  the  sample
and,  presumably,  profitable  investment  opportunities  have  been  lost.  In  the
paper's  conclusions,  we use  those  results  to  offer  some policy  recommendations.
II.  THORETICAL  FRAHEWORK
In  this  section  we develop  an  optimal  model  of  private  investment  behavior
in  the  context  of  an  owner-managed  representative  firm  operating  in  an  economy
characterized  by  credit  rationing,  and  administratively  set  interest  rates.  To
finance  its  investment  outlays,  the  firm  can  resort  either  to  its  own  internally
generated  source  of  funds,  i.e.  retained  earnings,  or  to  borrowing  from  the5
banking  sector. 7
Also,  siuce  the  firm  is  owner-managed,  no  managerial  incentive  problems  are
operative,  and the obj. tive  of the firm is to maximize  the  present  value of
future  stream  f  net  cash flows. Formally,  let  net  cash flow  in real  terms  at
time  t be R(t),  and  p  be the  discount  rate,  then the  long-term  objective  of
the  firm  can  be stated  as,
max f  e-PtR ( t) dt  (1)
By  virtue  of  the  assumption  that  the  firm  cannot  resort  to  new  equity  issue
through  the  stock  market,  its  net  cash  flow  (income)  can  be  derived  simply  as  net
operating  profit  (net  of taxes  and  interest)  plus  new bank loans  that  the firm
can raise in the market,  minus debt amortization,  and minus new investment
expenditures.
R(t)  =  (1-T)  t(IKM.)1  - t(1-?)r(t)-x(t)+a]B(t)  +b(t)  -q(t)I(t)  (2)
where  w(.)  - before  tax  profit,  taken  to  be  an increasing  and  concave  function
of K, i.e.  ->0,  aarsO,  '  the stock of real capital, B - total debt
outstanding, s  - the corporate  profit tax rate, r - interest  rate, a -
amortization  rate  on debt,  q - the  price  of  capital  goods  relative  to  outpat,  I
- gross  real  investment,  x - rate  of inflation,  and  all  variables  refer  to time
t.
If not further constraints  were operative,  the firm would solve the
optimization  problem  (1),  (2)  subject  to  the  evolution  of the  stocks  of capital
and  debt;
'  The implicit  assumption  here is that the firm does not raise capital
through  issuance  of new equity.  This assumption  is likely  to apply to many
developing  countries  where the equity  market  is not sufficiently  developed  or
broad  to serve  as  an important  source  of external  capital  to the  firm. For  the
case that the firm has the option  of recorse  to equity  market, see Dailami
(1990).6
kwr(  t) -8K( t) ardh(  t) -b I  F'  -aB(  t)
where  8  is the  rate  of depreciation  of  physical  capital.
In this  case  it can  be shc,w.  that  the  firm  would  raise  its  desired  amount
of loan  at each point in time.  At the  margin,  the  rei  I  cost of equity,  p ,
would  be equal  to the  real effective  cost  of debt  1(1-v)r-xj  ,  which implies
that  the  only  financial  variable  relevant  to the  firm's  investment  decision  is
the real after-tax  rate of interest. In other  words, the firm  would face  an
infinitely  elastic  supply  of credit. Figure  1  illustrates  for  a  given  point  in
time the  resulting  equilibrium  for  the firm. At point  R  no further  credit  is
desirable,  though it is still available  at a fixed cost.  This situation,
however,  hardly  describes  the  reality  of loan  markets  in developing  countries,
where excess demand for credit and consequently  quantity ciedit rationing
prevail. To formalize  this  phenomenon,  we introduce  a  time  varying  bank credit
ceiling  imposed  on each  firm.  Such  a  ceiling,  furthermore,  will be assumed  to
be dependent  on the firm's  net-worth  and on the state of credit  market as
de3cribed  by the  following  equation:
b~ ~  ~  ~~~~~f  (t)s  Xt  ;5  )),4o  ,  a  20  (3 )
where v(t) is the firm's  net worth at time t, and tb  cunction  4  (v,  S)
defines  the  bank credit  ceiling  imposed  on a firmv  ith  net  worth  v(t),  at time
t, when the state  of credit  market  is indicated  by S(t).  Thr state  of credit
market depends,  presumably,  on an array of factors including  the level of
interest  rates,  the  pace  of  credit  policy,  the  stringency  to  which  regulation  and
supervision  on the  banking  sector  is  imposed. Its  significance  is to  emphasize
the  possibility  that  credit  supply  to  a  particular  firm  may  change  as  the  result
of macro  and  financial fluctuations,  independently  of  the  firm's credit
worthiness,  i.e. its net worth.  Thus, in times of tight  money, i.e., "bad
times,"  borrowers  that  otherwise  would  have  been  considered  eligible  for  credit
are likely  to face  a  more stringent  credit  evaluation  process  or simply  denied7
loans. Also,  for  a  given  state  of the  credit  market  (i.e.  for  a  given  value  of
"S")  the  position  of the  credit  ceiling  will depend  on  *.he  firm's  investmevt  and
borrowing  history (i.e.  on its  current  net  worth).  There is, then,  a second
reason  (apart  from future  output  and  profits)  to invest  now:  by doing  so.  the
firm  can optimally  relax  tomorrow's  borrowing  constraint.
A  graphical  representation  of  the  supply  of  credit  schedule  facing  the  firm
under  binding  credit  const-aint  is shown  in  Figure  2.  The  equilibrium  point  is
shown  by point E", where the firm's  demand  for credit  intersects  its supply
schedule  in tho  vertical  portion. In this  case investment  will be constrained
by r'pply  of credit; indeed,  we have  p>(1-v)r-x  ,  implying  that there are
investment  opportunities  with  positive  net  present  value  which  are  not  undertaken
due to lack  of availability  of credit.
To solve  for  the firm's  optimal  time  path of capital  accumulation  under
credit  constraint,  we formulate  the  current  value  Hamiltonian,  H(t)  as:
Hi(t)  a(1-0)  [  WO  I  )- I(1-0)r(t)  -x(t)  ta B(t)  +b(t)  -q(t)  t  (t)
-X(t)  (1(t)-8K(t))+p(t)  (b(Ot)-B(t)  (4)
where  A (t)  and  p (t)  are  the  associated  shadow  prices  of capital  and  debt
respectively.
Taking into account the credit supply  constraint (1), we define the
Lagrangian  L(t)  as
L(t)-H(t)  +0(t)  ((V(t);(S))  -b(t))  (5)
where  Q(t)  is the  Lagrangian  multiplier  associated  with bank credit  ceiling
(3).  Given the assumption  that there  exists no uncertainty,  the necessary
conditions  for  an optimal  solution  are the  following:
.(a)  - (p+8)  A  (S)  -[(1-)  .;-q(s)  0 (a)  (6.a)
p (s)  - (p  4) it (s)  + [ (1-1)  r(s)  -x(s)  +a+Q  (a)  4,,j  (6.b)
abiL4bp  (a)  -0  (a)  -0  (6.C)8
Figure  1: Flrm's  Equilibrium  Without  Credit  Ceilings
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simplifying  the  above  equations,  we  obtain  the  following  two  basic  equationst
(1-0  (  uq(s)  [p+8 -4(s)-n  (8)*  (J7)
(s)-'Ip+  *  s  T  a  x(s)(7)
4  is  the  rate  of  inflation  in  the  price  of  capital  goods.
Equation  (7)  describes  the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  firm's  optimum
level  of real capital.  It states  that,  at equilibrium,  the firm's  after-tax
marginal  profitability  of  capital  [left-hand  side  of  (7)1,  has  to  be  equal  to  its
cost  of  capital.  tNote  that  the  cost  of  capital  depends  not  only  on  the  usual
depreciation,  discount  and  inflation  rate  but also  on an extra  term,  which
captures  the  effect  of  the  credit  ceiling  on  the  firm's  investment  behavior;  it
describes  the  value  of  having  an  extra  unit  of  capital  today  as  a  way  of  relaxing
the  borrowing  constraint  in  the  future  (because,  ceteris  paribus,  more  capital
accumulation  today  means  more  net  worth  tomorrow).  Naturally,  if  the  credit
ceiling  constraint  (3)  is  not  binding,  Q(W)-0  ;  and  in  that  case  the  supply  of
credit  facing  the  firm  would  be  horizontal  at  the  current  rate  of  interest,  and
credit  policy  could  affect  investment  only  through  the  interest  rate  channel.
But  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  so  far  a.  p>(1-?)r-x  ,  or  the  real  return
on  equity  is  greater  than  the  after-tax  real  cost  of  debt;  the  credit  constraint
(3)  must  be  binding.  In  that  case, Q(s)oo,  which  from  equation  (8)  can  be10
solved  to  yield;
O(t)fexi  -(P+*+.uu)du)|P-(1-T)r(3)-x(sa  ds  (9)
which  is  the  capitalized  difference  in  the  real  after-tax  cost  of  debt  and  equity
per  unit  of  bank  credit.  To  the  extent  that p>(1-T)r-x  or  the  real  cost  of
debt  falls  short  of the  real  coot  of equity,  a condition  which  is rather
prevalent  in  most  developing  countries,  debt  is  subsidized,  and  a  measure  of  such
subsidy  is  given  by  D  (s)  in  equation  (9).
From  this  equation  it  is  also  evident  th,at  the  value  of Q(t)  the  shadow
price  of  credit,  depends  on  the  future  evolution  of  both  interest  rate  and  credit
market  conditions.  Thus,  if  credit  policy  is  expected  to  be tightened  in  the
future,  i.e.  relatively  low  values  of  S(s);  for  s - t,  t+1,  t+2...,  the  firm
would  prefer  tn  invest  more  today;'  in  this  way,  it  will  be  holding  a larger
capital  stock  (and  net  worth)  tomorrow,  allowing  easier  access  to  credit  when  it
is  more  scarce. Likewise,  the  prospect  of rising  interest  rates  accelerates
investment  today.
Finally,  substituting  fr  Q(t) from  equation  (9)  into  equation  (J)  and
solvir.g  that  equation  for  the  firm's  optimum  level  of  capital.  stock  yields  a
function  which  would  depend  on the determinants  of the  firm's  profits,  the
current  and  future  values  of  interest  rate,  and  other  variables  describing  the
8  Of  course,  we  are  assuming  that  the  "ti8hter"  credit  conditions  do  not
affect  the  investment  opportunities  (and  profits)  of  the  firm.  Also,  notice  that
we  are  assuming  away  time-consistency  and  credibility  problems.  The  government
could  pronaise  a  "loose"  credit  policy  path  (i.e.  big D(t)  for  t  - 0,1,2,..),
get  private  firms  to  invest  "a  lot,"  and  then  tighten  credit  (say,  for  price
stabilization  purposes). If  private  agents  know  the  government's  objective
function  (they  probably  do over  time),  firms'  investment  plans  will  not  be
independent  of  the  government's  course  of  credit  and,  presumably,  macro  policy11
future  evolution  of  the  state  of  credit  market.
Thus,  it  can  be  concluded  that,  as  long  as  the  firm's  discount  rate  is
higher  than  its  cost  of debt,  (i.e.,  profitable  investment  opportunities  are
available),  the  current  level  of  investment  depends  on  the  future  evolution  of
both  interest  rate  and  credit  market  conditions.  This  hypothesis  provides  the
basis  for  our  empirical  analysis  presented  in  the  next  section.12
III.  EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS
In this  section  we will  examine  empirically  the  relationship  between
credit  market  conditions  and  private  investment  behavior  for  a sample  of five
developing  countries,  i.e.  Brazil,  Colombia,  India,  Korea,  and  Turkey,  using
annual  data  from  1965  to 1985.  The  main objective  is to test  for  the  partial
and the  joint  influence  of credit  availability  and interest  rates  (i.e.
quantity  and  price  constraints)  on the  behavior  of aggregate,  private
investment  in that  sample  of countries.
A preliminary  plot (Charts  I to  V) of actual  domestic  credit  and  actual
private  inv..stment  (both  as  percentages  of GDP)  does  not reveal  any  obvious
link.  In fact,  aggregate  private  investment  seems  to exhibit  its  own
independent  pattern.  It  has declined  steadily  since  the  second  half of  the
7Os  in the  two  Latin-American  cases,  while  domestic  credit  availability  has
tended  to grow.  .rivate  investment  remained  flat  both in India  and  Turkey,  in
the  face  of growing,  albeit  fluctuating,  domestic  credit  supply.  Korea  is
indeed  the  only  country  in the  sample  that  exhibits  an  upward  trend  in
aggregate  private  investment,  although  at a much  slower  pace than  domestic
credit.
Of course,  our  charts  do not control  for  other  factors  affecting  private
investment  decisions,  most  notably  growth  in  real  economic  activity  and
expected  real interest  rate.  A more thorough  regression  analysis  is  needed.
Following  our  model's  conclusions  in the  previous  sections,  we will specify  a13
basic  estimating  equation  that  expresses  the  ratio  of  private  fixed  investment
to  GDP  (noted  by  RIGDP),  a8  a  function  of  three  variables:  (1)  the  rate  of
growth  in  real  GDP,  (RGDPG);  (it)  the  expected  future  value  of  the  ratio  of
total  domestic  credit  to  GDP  (EDCGDP);  and  (iii)  the  expected  future  value  of
the  real  rate  of  interest  (ERINT).  That  is:
PIGDP4  - *oW  +  ,,  RGDPG 0 +  06  EDCGDP 1 +  U5 ERINT  I  + u  (10)
where  a.,  a 1, a,  and  4 are  parameters  to  be  estimated  and  u,  is  an  error  term,
and  where  the  credit  and  interest  rate  variables  indicate  their  expected,
future  values  as  of  time  "t".  Subscript  "i"  denotes  the  country  (i-  Brazil,
colombia,...).
There  exist  several  methodological  problems  with  the  straightforward,
ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimation  of  (10)  on  a  country-by-country  basis.
First,  the  use  of  aggregate  data  makes  the  right-hand  side  variables
endogenous,  creating  simultaneous-equation  bias.  For  instance,  in  any  given
year  "t",  an  unexpected  macroeconomic  shock  (imbedded  in  the  error  term  "u,")
is  likely  to  drive  not  only  aggregate  private  investment  (the  dependent
variable)  but  also  the  rate  of  growth  of  real  GDP  (an  independent  one);  in
this  case,  the  OLS  regression  coefficient  for  RGDPG  will  not  only  capture  the
direct  effect  of  movements  in  this  variable  but  also  the  indirect  effect  of
ra&dom  macro  shocks.  In  other  words,  our  estimate  of  the  influence  of  RGDPG  on
its  own  right  will  be  (in  general)  inaccurate.
Second,  expected  series  are  unobservable  as  we  do  not  know  what  expectation14
formation  mechanism  (if  any)  agents  employ.  We need a  way to  proxy  for  those
series.
Third,  although  we have succeeded  in  compiling  consistent  time  series  data  on
aggregate  private  investment  for  each  country,  they  are still  quite  short.'
Fourth,  the  structure  of the  shocks  affecting  private  investment  have  probably
changed  over  the last  two  decades  (most  notably  in  Korea),  raising  the
possibility  of intra-country  heteroskedasticity.  For instance,  the  development
of  more active  stock  markets  could  have  changed  the  structure  (i.e.  the
distribution)  of informational  shocks  affecting  investment  decisions.
To overcome  (at  least  partially)  those  problems,  we have  pooled  the
country  eguations  (not  their  data  time  series)  and  have  estimated  expression
(10)  as a simultaneous  equation  system  (for  i-Brazil,  Colombia,...)  by means
of the  three-stage  least  squares  technique,  constraining  cross-country
parameters  to  be zero.  Specifically,  we have estimated  the  following  system:
PIGDPW  - Nb  +  Cab RGDPGb  +  ca,  EDCGDPw  +  06  ERINT,  +  ul
PIGDPce  - 4c +  C 18 RGDPG.,  +  Qa, EDCGDPt  +  af ERINT%  +  uu
PIGDP,  - ao  +  t,,  RGDPG,4  +  ai,  EDCGDPM  +  Ga  ERINTt  +  u,t  (11)
PIGDPM  - 06 + C11,  RGDPG, +  06 EDCGDPM  + as  ERINTm  +  u.
PIGDPqt  - °oq  +  Glq  RGDPGqt  +  aq,  EDCGDPqt  +  a.  ERINTqt  +  uqt
2/  Twenty-one  observations  per  country,  from  which lead  and lags  are to  be
discounted.15
where:  "bO-Brazil,  "c"-Colombia,  "n"-India,  "k"-Korea,  "q"-Turkey.  As  before,
"t"  stands  for  time  period.
It  is  worth  noting  that  we  have  pooled  the  countries'  equatiQna,  not
their  time  series;  for  example,  Brazil's  and  Korea's  real  GDP  growth  rates  are
treated  as  different  variables  and,  hence,  will  have  different  estimated
regression  coefficient.  Accordingly,  we  have  generated  a  regression
coefficient  for  each  variable  in  each  countrv°.  .
This  econometric  set-up  is  particularly  useful  as  it  allows  us  to  profit
from  the  existence  of  cross-country  contomporaneous  correlation  of  the
disturbances".  That  correlation  has  probably  been  generated  by  international
macroeconomic  developments;  for  example,  in  each  country,  the  oil  shocks
affected  the  observations  for  the  years  1973  and  1979.
As  for  the  estimation  itself,  we  have  used  three-stage  least  squares;
this  technique  has  allowed  us  to  incorporate  enough  instrumental  variables  in
order  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  the  endogeneity  of  the  right-hand  side
1Q/ Other  commonly-used  pooling  techniques  pool  variables  according  to  their
economic  meaning,  with  no  consideration  for  country  differences.  Thus,  for
example,  real  GDP  growth  in  Brazil  is  pooled  together  with  Korea's  in  a  single
series.  Then,  only  one  regression  coefficient  is  generated  per  "pooled"
variable.
II/  In  a separate  exercise,  we  estimated  each  country's  equation  individually
through  two-stage  least  squares.  The  corresponding  Breusch-Pagan  test  on  the
residuals  has  shown  significant  contemporaneous  correlation,  suggesting  the
suitable  joined  estimation  of  the  equations.  Also,  no  statistically
significant  coefficient  was  obtained  whatsoever;  in  that  sense,  the  much
better  performance  of  the  simultaneous-equation  approach  points  to  the
shortness  of  the  series  as  the  probable  cause  for  the  initial  lack  of
precision.16
variables.  The  latter  feature  has  been  particularly  relevant  as  we  have
proxied  expected  values  by  actual  ones,  instrumenting  them  with  their  first
(respect  co  expectation  formation  time)  lag.  At  the  same  time,  we  have
estimated  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  (of  the  White-
Chamberlain  type).
Our  findings  are  contained  in  Panels  A,  B  and  C  of  Table  1.  When  current
(i.e.  at  time  "t"),  actual  credit  and  interest  rate  series  are  used  as  proxies
(and  their  first-lags  as  their  instruments)  for  those  variables  own  future
path,  the  results  are  mixed.  In  three  out  of  five  countries  the  expected
credit  availability  variable  shows  up  positive  and  significant  (very  much  so
in  Korea  and  Turkey),  while  it  remains  insignificant  for  the  rest.  Quite  a
similar  pattern  for  interest  rates:  negative  and  significant  in  Brazil  and
Turkey,  insignificant  in  India  and  Korea,  but  surprisingly  positive  and
significant  in  Colombia.  (See  Panel  A,  Table  1).
The  results  improve  considerably  when  one-year-forward,  actual  credit
and  interest  rate  series  are  employed  (instrumented  by  their  first  lags).  The
credit  variables  are  now  statistically  significant,  implying  a  positive  role
for  credit  availability  in  the  determination  of  private  investment  in  all
countries.  As  for  interest  rates,  they  are  also  significant  throughout,  but
with  counter-intuitive  signs  both  in  Colombia  and  India  (See  Panel  B,  Table
1).
In  Panel  C  of  Table  1,  we  combine  the  proxies  that  appeared  most
suitable  in  the  previous  Panels.  That  is,  we  use  one-period-forward  credit  and17
c  interest  rates  (both  actual  ones,  and  instrumented  by  their  respective
first  lags).  The  results  are  quite  conclusive.  The  credit  variables  are  again
positive  and  (very)  significant  in  all  countries,  while  interest  rates  are
either  significantly  negative  or  statistically  irrelevant.
We  have  so  far  concentrated  in  the  statistical  significance  of
individual  parameters  in  our  "system"  of  equations;  traditional  t-statistics
suffice  for  that  purpose."'  We  next  test  for  the  joint  significance  of  credit
and  interest  rate  variables  in  each  country.  In  other  words,  we  want  to
compare  the  results  from  the  full  estimation  of  (l:)  with  those  of  the
estimation  of (11)  after  the  credit  and  interest  rate  variables  of  a given
countlv  are  removed  (i.e.  their  regression  coefficlents  are  restricted  to  be
equal  to  zero).  For  that  purpose,  we  have  compared  successively  the  residual
performance  of  the  unrestricted  estimation  of  the  whole  system  with  its
restricted  counter-parts,  being  the  restriction  applied  to  one  country's
equation  at  a  time.  The  results  were  straightforward:  for  none  of  the
specifications  in  Panel  A through  C of  Table  1,  and  for  no  country,  could  we
accept  the  hypothesis  that  the  credit  Bd  interest  rate  variables  are  not
relevant  (See  Table  2).  In  other  words,  both  the  credit  supply  and  the
interest  rate  matter,  Jointly,  for  private  investment  outlays.
12/  See,  for  instance,  Judge  et.al.  (1985)  Chapter  15.
>/ See  Judge  et.al.,  op.cit.,  Chapter  15  for  the  specification  of  the
corresponding  )?-dLstributed  statistic.18
Regression  of  ggg  te  r  vote  nvaestment rate  on
eal,  growth  of  output,  real  tLerest  rate  and  credit  supply
(Annual  data  1965-1985)
PIDPi  '  01  *  *  RGDPOIC  *  %J  EDCGDP  1V *  * ERlzmJC  . Ule
Parameter  Brazil  Colombia  India  Korsa  Turkey
1mL  a
ea  0.144  0.142  0.088  0.165  0.018
(3.90)  (7.00)  (25.3)  (9.22)  (1.24)
a1  0.249  0.159  0.064  0.029  0.135
(3.44)  (1.59)  (1.16)  (0.42)  (4.53)
Ga  0.264  -0.091  0.013  0.140  0.142
(2.56)  (-1.04)  (1.21)  (5.60)  (4.13)
'as  -0.210  0.112  -0.013  -0.001  -0.056
(-2.13)  (2.61)  (-0.36)  (-0.02)  (-4.30)
Panel  B
a*  0.080  0.061  0.085  0.122  0.040
(3.48)  (2.60)  (23.4)  (7.52)  (3.12)
a,  0.054  0.075  0.026  0.089  0.006
(1.41)  (0.61)  (1.89)  (1.31)  (0.22)
62  0.409  0.299  0.026  0.220  0.110
(4.42)  (3.18)  (2.81)  (8.8)  (3.33)
a3  -0.155  0.093  0.029  -0.129  -0.061
(-2.35)  (2.15)  (3.04)  (-2.41)  (-5.22)
Panel  C
sO  0.70  0.063  0.083  0.130  0.026
(2.80)  (2.76)  (23.0)  (7.63)  (1.63)
a1  0.169  0.144  0.040  0.067  0.098
(3.34)  (1.37)  (1.24)  (0.98)  (2.91)
L2  0.406  0.2.8  0.30  0.207  0.126
(4.02)  (2.69)  (3.47)  (8.21)  (3.08)
43  -0.121  0.059  0.006  -0.005  -0.062
(-2.10)  (1.28)  (0.27)  (-0.09)  (-3.65)
Heteroe0dastLcity-consistent  t-statistics  in  parenten  als19
TABLE  2
Are  the  Capital  Market  Variables  Jointly  Significant  in  each  Coutry?
Hx  a  0  3'  0  for  I  - Brazil,  Colombia...
(Critical  Xi  at  952  confidence  and  2  degrees  of  freedoms  5.99)
PROXIES  BRAZIL  COLOMBIA  I1DIA  KOREA  TUSY
ARE:
DCGDt  11.59  6.86  1.93  32.47  25.24
lINTt
DCGD.,  38.09  21.90  10.85  85.25  33.98
INT. 1
DCGDt.,  23.31  11.50  13.25  68.61  18.41
RINTt20
IV. CONCLUSION
In  their  decisions  to  extend  loans,  banks  are  known  to  be  concerned  not  only
with  the  creditworthiness  of  the  individual  borrower,  but  also  with  broader  issues
relating  to the stance  of credit  and interest  rate policy,  regulatory  and
supervisory  practices,  and  market  sentiments.  These  factors  are  often  referred  to
as  determining  the  state  of  the  credit  market,  and  their  significance  lies  in  their
influence  on  banks'  degree  of  conservatism  and  credit  rationing.  They  thus  affect
the  banks'  loan  supply  ca.z-sions  independently  of  the  creditworthiness;  i.e.  net-
worth  of  individual  borrowers.  Thus,  in  times  of  tight  money,  or  in  "bad  times,"
borrowers  that  otherwise  would  have  been  considered  eligible  are  likely  to  face  a
more stringent  credit  evaluation  process  or simply  be denied  loans.  As a
consequence,  firms'  investment  plans  may  have  to  be  postponed  or  cut  back.
Motivated  by this  phonomenon,  this  paper  has  developed  a simple  model  of
firms'  investment  behavior  in  an  economy  with  exogenous,  time-varying  borrowing
constraints.  A  particular  form  of  credit  ceiling  linked  to  the  firm's  net-worth
and  to  the  state  of  credit  market  is  introduced.  The  model  suffices  to  illustrate
the  main  theoretica  message  of  the  papers It is  the  joint  impact  of  both  the
volume  of  credit  an;.  its  price,  i.e.  interest  rate,  which  is  relevant  to  firms'
investment  decisions.  Thus,  focusing  on  the  impact  of  interest  rate  changes  in
assessing  the  role  of  credit  policy  on  investment  and  growth  is  misleading  to  the
extent  that  such  changes  are  accompanied  by  changes  in  the  volume  of  credit  as
well.
The  model  is  then  used  to  specify  an  equation  relating  aggregate  private
itvestment  to  aggregate  output,  and  two  credit  market  variables;  real  interest  rate
and  aggregate  credit.  The  equation  was  estimated,  using  annual  data  (1965-85)  for
a sample  of  five  developing  countries,  i.e.  Brazil,  Colombia,  India,  Korea,  and
Turkey,  and the joint  significance  of both interest  rate  and credit  supply
conditions  are  tested. The  evidence  strongly  supports  the  joint  influence  of
interest  rates  and  credit  volume  on  the  behavior  of  private  investment  in  these
countries.  This  supports  the  theoretical  conclusion  of  the  paper  that  effective21
credit  policy  in  the  context  of  developing  countries  must  ac!'nowledge  the  influence
of  both  the  credit  supply  and  the  interest  rate  channels.  This  provide,  a  usoful
point  of  convergence  between  previous  approaches  to  credit  policy  and  its  role  In
the  stabilization  and  adjustment  processes  of  developing  countries,  which  have
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